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It is hard to say if Akhil Amar has chosen his time well, or 
if the times have chosen him. Whichever it is, Amar's recent 
writings on constitutional criminal procedure, now collected in a 
single volume, have certainly captured the moment. His work 
has drawn some praise, along with unusually pointed criticism.3 
This is not surprising, for when a scholar of Amar's stature en-
ters a field calling for ambitious changes, others in the field will 
respond. As advertised, Amar is indeed addressing the "first 
principles" of constitutional criminal procedure. 
This work, which has captured the spotlight, could also cap-
ture the future of criminal procedure. This is a time when the 
field of criminal procedure badly needs a new set of organizing 
principles. For at least a generation, the U.S. Supreme Court's 
1. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
2. Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. This is as good a time as any for 
full disclosure: I am a long-time friend of Akhil Amar. In fact, in 1987, Akhil publicly 
promised to my newborn son Andrew that the Yale Law School would admit him to its 
class of 2012. See Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Com-
ment, 97 Yale L.J. 281, 281 fn. t (1987) ("This story was composed for ... Drew Wright, 
YLS 2012 ... "). Only the reader can decide if I have been both a true and truthful 
friend; only time will tell if I have hurt Andrew's admissions standing. 
3. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Rethinking the Fifth Amendment (Again), Legal Times 
27 (July 17, 1995); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitu-
tional Law: "Here I Go Down that Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1559 (1996); 
Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Com-
pelled Testimony, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 929 (1995); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure for the 
Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1994); Carol S. 
Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 820 (1994); Morgan 
Cloud, Searching through History; Searching for History, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1707 (1996). 
Amar's impact on this area has been especially striking because his work appeared 
without warning. Amar's earlier writings had focused on questions of constitutional 
theory and structure, including the nature of the Bill of Rights. 
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criminal procedure "revolution" has created the framework for 
discussion. Warren Court decisions such as Mapp v. Ohio4 fo-
cused attention on the constitutional dimension of criminal pro-
cedure. Along the way, these cases created plenty of new obli-
gations for state law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and 
judges. 
Since then, vigilance among academic watchers of the Su-
preme Court has been the animating spirit of criminal proce-
dure. Most observers and teachers of criminal procedure have 
devoted themselves to following the latest word from the Su-
preme Court. We have judged the cases in light of the Court's 
earlier pronouncements, and have debated how far the Court 
has departed from the trajectory established in those Warren 
Court decisions.5 If the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a 
case, the issue becomes important enough to debate; if the Su-
preme Court has not yet addressed a question, it can wait. 
This way of thinking about criminal procedure has grown 
less satisfying and relevant over the years. For one thing, the 
Supreme Court has tried to make itself less prominent, by leav-
ing more questions to legislatures, state courts, and other institu-
tions. In many areas, the Court's self-denial has succeeded, and 
these other legal institutions have rushed in to set policy and 
create principles where the Supreme Court left them room to do 
so. Even where the Court has continued to announce constitu-
tional principles to guide criminal procedure, it has not moved 
in a direction that most observers wanted to see. When aca-
demic commentary grows more hopeless and irrelevant with 
each passing year of Supreme Court decisions, the commenta-
tors eventually find a way to reconcile themselves to a new real-
ity.6 They change the conversational subject. 
If vigilance in Supreme Court watching can no longer be the 
staple of criminal procedure, what will replace it? Has Amar 
given us a new conversational framework, to succeed our gen-
4. 367 u.s. 643 (1961). 
5. For an insightful recent effort to explain trends in the Supreme Court's crimi-
nal procedure jurisprudence, see Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional 
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466 (1996). 
6. For instance, Scott Sundby has proposed that a rhetoric of "mutual trust" might 
prove more relevant and persuasive to the U.S. Supreme Court than a rhetoric of pri-
vacy rights, when it comes to evaluating government searches and seizures. Scott E. 
Sundby, "Everyman's" Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Govern-
ment and Citizen, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 1751 (1994). 
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eration-long debate about the Supreme Court's departure from 
the Warren Court revolution? 
I believe that Amar has indeed changed the framework for 
discussing some of the Supreme Court's work. In particular, this 
book could break our dependence on U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent, and change the criteria for what makes a strong ar-
gument in constitutional criminal procedure. But I have greater 
doubts about a second element of Amar's program. He claims 
that constitutional criminal procedure needs to become more 
like "mainstream" constitutional law in its methodology. How-
ever, this is not what the future holds for criminal procedure. 
The distinctive structure of the institutions developing criminal 
procedure principles will always create a criminal procedure 
with a different flavor. Constitutional law in the criminal justice 
field must develop a more complete theory of how constitutions 
can accommodate many interpretations by many different insti-
tutions. It must create more elaborate ways for constitutional 
and nonconstitutional sources of law to interact. Criminal pro-
cedure, in short, needs a more refined etiquette, a set of expec-
tations for respectful interaction. 
I 
Although Amar makes a number of intriguing claims about 
constitutional criminal procedure, they all flow from a central 
methodological insight. When courts and others must interpret 
the provisions of a constitution relating to the criminal process, 
they should use the same constitutional methods that constitu-
tional interpreters use in other settings. As Amar puts it, 
[T]he kind of constitutional law discourse and scholarship that 
now dominates criminal procedure is generally, in a word, bad 
constitutional law-constitutional law insouciant about consti-
tutional text, ignorant of constitutional history, and inatten-
tive to constitutional structure .... Good constitutional crimi-
nal procedure must be, first and foremost, good constitutional 
law-developed with respect for things like text, history, and 
structure. (pp. ix-x) 
Amar's book lives up to this promise. It uses classic consti-
tutional law methodology in creative and surprising ways to shed 
light on many longstanding arguments of criminal procedure, 
and to offer a unified take on the subject. 
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Amar's constitutional methodology places text, history, and 
structure at the forefront. He also mentions "practicality" or 
common sense as an important interpretive device: "proper 
methodology of constitutional criminal procedure does not blind 
itself to practical effects." (p. 154) Supreme Court decisions 
from the past, and their consistency over time, move back into 
the shadows. This is not to say that Amar ignores precedent en-
tirely, as a glance at the book's extensive table of cases will 
show. What the Supreme Court has said about the Bill of Rights 
over time matters, but where the precedent is self-contradictory 
and confused (as it frequently is on criminal procedure ques-
tions), Amar is quicker than most interpreters to abandon the 
least attractive lines of cases. 
This is a recipe for radicality, but it produces more changes 
in rationales than changes in case outcomes. In one of his more 
striking claims, Amar uses textual and historical methods when 
he argues that we should abandon the "exclusionary rule" as the 
primary remedy for improper searches and seizures.7 (pp. 20-31) 
He points out that the text of the Fourth Amendment does not 
mention exclusion of evidence, even by implication. The argu-
ment then looks to early American practice under the Fourth 
Amendment, which relied solely on tort actions against govern-
ment agents who carried out improper searches or seizures. 
Then, building on the observations of John Henry Wigmore,8 
Amar points to the practical harms that exclusion of reliable 
evidence has on judges interpreting the Constitution and on the 
public's confidence in the system. 
Textual and historical arguments also lead Amar to the 
claim that there is no "preference" for warrants built into the 
Fourth Amendment, despite the announcement of such a pref-
erence in many Supreme Court decisions. Instead, the Fourth 
Amendment commands only that searches and seizures be 
"reasonable." (pp. 3-17) The requirements for issuing a war-
rant appear in a separate clause in the text, and do not explicitly 
modify the more general requirement of "reasonableness" that 
appears in the first clause. Similarly, the "probable cause" men-
tioned in the text, Amar argues, is not the presumptive level of 
7. For the earlier version of Amar's arguments on this score, see Akhil Reed 
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757 (1994). 
8. John H. Wigmore, 4 Wigmore on Evidence§§ 2813-84 (Little, Brown, and Co., 
2d ed. 1923). Amar adds an argument based on precedent, by suggesting that the origi-
nal exclusionary rule cases were an attempt to enforce the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments simultaneously. 
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justification that the government must give for all searches and 
seizures. (pp. 17-20) Once again, "reasonableness" provides the 
general standard for searches and seizures to satisfy; the text re-
quires probable cause only for warranted searches. Historical 
arguments also support each of these claims about warrants and 
probable cause. For instance, Amar points to eighteenth-
century statutes authorizing warrantless searches and searches 
based on a justification less than probable cause, and finds no 
early declarations that warrants or probable cause are ordinarily 
necessary to demonstrate the reasonableness of a search or sei-
zure. (pp. 7, 18) 
The text of the Fifth Amendment leads Amar to reject, at 
an even more fundamental level, the Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence of self-incrimination.9 For Amar, the critical term in the 
text is "witness": no person shall be compelled to be a "witness" 
against himself or herself. This text, he argues, does not bar all 
efforts to compel a witness to help the government prove its 
case. Instead, it prevents the use in evidence of a defendant's 
testimony. This prohibition leaves the government free, how-
ever, to use the "fruit" of any compelled statement against the 
witness. (pp. 70-71) For instance, if the government compels a 
defendant (through threat of imprisonment for contempt of 
court) to describe where she hid the gun she used in an armed 
robbery, the government could not introduce her statement at 
trial, but it could introduce the gun and any fingerprints found 
on it. History again plays a supporting role in the argument, for 
many nineteenth-century cases held that the privilege against 
self-incrimination extended only this far, and it was common-
place in early American criminal justice for magistrates to ques-
tion the accused before trial. (pp. 69, 78-82) Arguments based 
on the practical effects of legal rules also have relevance here. 
Amar points out that innocent defendants could, under this 
reading of the Fifth Amendment, compel the testimony of de-
9. One measure of the fundamental nature of Amar's critique in this area would 
be the proportion of the Supreme Court's decisions which he believes to be wrongly de-
cided. On Fourth Amendment questions, Amar provides a rationale for the general di-
rection of the Supreme Court's cases over the last generation. He rejects only a few of 
the holdings, but much more often rejects their confused rationales, along with much of 
the academic commentary criticizing those decisions. Amar also finds fault with only a 
few outcomes of Supreme Court decisions in Sixth Amendment areas over the last gen-
eration. On Fifth Amendment questions, however, his approach calls into question a 
greater number of the Court's holdings, and suggests that there is more unresolved ten-
sion within the Fifth Amendment case, originating in the Fifth Amendment cases 
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and the other "non-testimonial" evidence 
cases. (pp. 87-88) 
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fense witnesses who might otherwise invoke their own privilege 
against self-incrimination. 10 
Structural arguments, based on the relationships among dif-
ferent clauses of the Constitution, also form the basis for some 
of Amar's prescriptions. This species of argument is especially 
important to his views on the Sixth Amendment rights to 
speedy, public and fair trials. 11 This collection of guarantees, he 
claims, share a common theme. They all attempt to produce a 
trial which will, with the areatest accuracy possible, separate the 
innocent from the guilty. The clauses of the Sixth Amendment 
"do not protect only innocents, but they do protect only inno-
cence; they protect the guilty only an incidental by-product of 
protecting the innocent because of their innocence." (p. 91) 
Thus, any legal rules that divert attention from this truth-finding 
function of the criminal trial for the sake of controlling or pun-
ishing government misconduct run the risk of creating "upside-
down effects"-rules that give the guilty more protection, often 
at the expense of the innocent. 
Amar takes particular pains to criticize "the mother of all 
upside-down exclusionary rules": the Supreme Court's frequent 
declaration that dismissal is the only possible remedy for viola-
tions of the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial right. In most 
cases, he argues, this remedy does not fit the legal interests in-
jured because of the delay, and provides a greater benefit to the 
guilty than to the innocent. Instead of dismissal, monetary dam-
ages (paid by the government) for loss of liberty or reputation 
would fully compensate most victims of delay. (pp. 96-116) 
Amar also notes the practical effects of the "dismissal only" 
rule, suggesting that the severity of the remedy has made judges 
reluctant to declare violations even when they plainly have oc-
10. For an earlier version of this argument, see Akhil Reed Amar and Renee B. 
Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 Mich. L. 
Rev. 857 (1995). 
11. For an earlier version, see Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment 
First Principles, 84 Geo. L.J. 641 (1996). 
12. Amar's support for treating the pursuit of truth as the "deep principle" built 
into the structure of the Sixth Amendment is uncharacteristically thin. He points to the 
placement of several different guarantees of speedy trial, public trial, and fair trial in the 
same amendment (the Sixth). While it is possible to read each of these clauses in a way 
which emphasizes the pursuit of truth, they might also be read to serve alternative (and 
sometimes competing) values, such as preventing the most intrusive types of govern-
ment behavior. The fact that these clauses appear together in one amendment does not 
reinforce one or the other reading of these clauses. 
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curred.13 A more palatable set of remedies would lead to greater 
integrity in interpreting the rights. 
The emphasis on reliable outcomes at trial also appears in 
the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause, which allows a de-
fendant to confront the "witnesses" against him. Here again, 
Amar wades into a long-running controversy of criminal proce-
dure: the relationship between the confrontation clause and the 
hearsay rule. He argues that the Sixth Amendment's text and its 
structural emphasis on protection of innocence should allow 
courts to hear some reliable forms of hearsay. The confronta-
tion clause, he says, only extends to statements of "witnesses" at 
trial or in formal trial-like settings such as depositions. It should 
not bar witnesses from describing hearsay statements by out-of-
court declarants. (pp. 125-31) 
Another structural argument enables Amar to make what 
are, in my opinion, his most important contributions to many of 
the criminal procedure controversies he discusses. Amar insists 
at every turn that the Bill of Rights is designed to strengthen the 
role of the jury, in government generally and in criminal justice 
in particular. The criminal jury was one of the few rights explic-
itly mentioned in the original Constitution (in Article III), and 
juries were among the top priorities of the state ratifying con-
ventions as they proposed constitutional amendments which 
later became the jury provisions in the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments. The jury was the populist influence in the judicial 
branch, to counterbalance the judge, just as the House of Repre-
sentatives was the populist influence in the legislative branch, to 
counterbalance the Senate. 
The structural centrality of the jury figures in several of the 
controversies Amar discusses. For instance, because the Consti-
tution views the jury as an incorruptible fact finder and a popu-
list political institution, a defendant may not waive a jury trial in 
favor of a bench trial. (p. 120) Amar also supports the power of 
the jury to nullify unjust (or unjustly applied) criminal laws by 
refusing to convict despite overwhelming evidence. Similarly, 
he disapproves of devices such as special verdicts which increase 
the opportunities for the judge to control the jury. (pp. 122-23) 
The importance of the jury also gives structural strength to 
Amar's Fourth Amendment claims, discussed above. When 
13. Indeed, dismissal occurs so infrequently in practice that it is difficult to see why 
Amar directs so much of his fire toward this neglected doctrine. 
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Amar asserts that the Fourth Amendment does not embody a 
requirement or preference for warrants, he relies on many ex-
amples from early American practice where warrants were not 
required. A generations-old argument about the relationship 
between the warrant clause and the "reasonableness" clause has 
focused on the meaning of these early practices. Do these early 
examples demonstrate that warrantless searches were not gen-
erally considered unreasonable, or do they merely confirm that 
some exceetions to the warrant requirement are tolerable or ap-
propriate? 4 Amar moves this shopworn debate to a different 
and more productive level: he clarifies how the enthusiasm for 
juries in the Constitution's founding era may have translated 
into a distrust of warrants. 
Warrants, it seems, were not preferred because when a gov-
ernment agent obtained a warrant, it immunized him from later 
tort liability for any improper search. 15 Warrants took away the 
power of the jury. Hence, according to Amar, the Fourth 
Amendment mentions warrants primarily to prevent their over-
use and to prohibit the broadest and most abusive forms of war-
rants. (pp. 10-17) 
Because warrants today provide a way to obtain preclear-
ance for searches, obtaining a warrant might help to establish 
reasonableness in some settings. (pp. 38-39) But constitutional 
reasonableness, says Amar, does not begin with warrants or 
probable cause. Instead, he pictures juries working with other 
institutions to give meaning to the reasonableness concept. 
Legislators and executive rulemakers provide two sources of en-
forcement: they can pass statutes and rules to specify what 
searches are acceptable. Judges provide another layer of en-
forcement, sometimes drawing on common law and constitu-
tional law concepts (for instance, free speech principles in news-
paper search cases) to define reasonableness. Finally, juries in 
tort actions based on improper searches or seizures can apply 
their own common sense definition of reasonableness, even 
14. The classic formulations of the two leading theories appeared in Telford Tay-
lor, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation (Ohio State U. Press, 1969) and Nelson 
B. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution (Johns Hopkins Press, 1937). More recent discussions of this issue, return-
ing to the themes which Lasson and Taylor sounded, appear in Maclin, 68 S. Cal. Rev. 
(cited in note 3), and Cloud, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. (cited in note 3). 
15. For further discussion of this point, and the difference between general war-
rants and writs of assistance, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, 
and the Writs of Assistance, 30 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 53,76-80 (1996). 
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where they do not agree with the definitions of other enforcers. 
(pp. 43-45) 
On the whole, Amar does not pose new questions for 
criminal procedure; this book revisits classic debates of criminal 
procedure over the last generation. But Amar's interpretive 
method uncovers some new evidence in answer to those classic 
questions, and offers a way to ~rioritize the evidence which may 
have a bearing on the answers. 6 
II 
So what are the book's prospects for the future? Will 
Amar's use of traditional constitutional methodologies replace 
vigilant Court-watching as the primary job of the criminal pro-
cedure observer? The answer to this question is, "Yes and no." 
Amar leaves one crucial methodological task undone, but makes 
a promising start on a second task which will be critical to the 
future of constitutional criminal procedure. 
A 
Amar deftly handles many knotty issues along the way in 
this book. He makes it look easy. But this virtuosity also makes 
it easy to overlook an important component missing from his 
methodology. An account of the Constitution in criminal pro-
cedure should give a sense of its own outer bounds. When does 
the Constitution no longer control our choices? When does it 
no longer offer even a sense of direction? There are times when 
the best response to textual, historical or structural evidence is 
to say that it helps very little in deciding a current controversy. 
Amar's interpretive method does not give much guidance 
on how to account for equivocal evidence based on text, history 
16. For example, Amar has (I believe) changed the type of evidence relevant to 
the relationship between warrants and reasonableness. Early American disputes fo-
cused on searches pursuant to improper warrants, and modern arguments have revolved 
around the meaning of that experience when it comes to unwarranted searches. Given 
the role of warrants to undermine the power of colonial juries, should the use of war-
rants in some settings be interpreted as the preferred practice, or a necessary evil to be 
limited? Amar suggests that some positive statements about warrants (and not just their 
appearance in statutes or in practice) should be necessary to show that warrants were 
considered the prototypical reasonable search during the founding period. While Cloud, 
63 U. Chi. L. Rev. (cited in note 3), and others have pointed to the early use of warrants, 
and to statutes which provide for warrants (and for unwarranted searches in situations 
which we might describe today as "exigent circumstances"), this does not respond to the 
insight about the impact of warrants on juries. 
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and structure. As Amar acknowledges, his standard interpretive 
methods sometimes yield different answers. (pp. 94-95) But he 
does not develop here an explicit method for resolving conflicts 
among types of evidence, or ambiguous evidence within a single 
type. 
History and text are uneven guides. These methods do ex-
clude some possibilities, and resolve some questions. For other 
issues, history and text are merely suggestive; they push more in 
one direction than another. But how often do they help us se-
lect from viable options in criminal justice today? Especially 
when one considers that the criminal justice world is so pro-
foundly changed from the 1790s (consider the fact that police 
departments did not even exist at the time), history might pro-
vide only a very rough insight into the meaning of some consti-
tutional texts. When a historical practice is highly ambiguous or 
has no clear analogy in modern practice, perhaps the constitu-
tional meaning of that history should be cast tentatively, or at a 
fairly high level of generality. 
An example may show the wisdom of using history only for 
a general sense of direction. According to Amar, historical 
practices support the position that the Constitution does not re-
quire an exclusionary remedy for illegal searches and seizures. 
American courts did not exclude illegally-obtained evidence un-
til the 1880s, and even then most states did not exclude evidence 
until the 1950s and 60s. Tort suits were the ordinary remedy 
through much of our constitutional history. 
But the founding era represents only one phase of the his-
tory of remedies for illegal searches and seizures, and probably 
not the most illuminating phase. During the twentieth century, 
American courts have reflected on their long experience with 
tort remedies; many have found the remedies inadequate. After 
the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the exclusionary rule for the 
federal system in 1914/7 some high state courts began to choose 
for themselves what remedy to require. At this point, state high 
courts endorsed or reaffirmed tort remedies, more often than 
not. 18 By 1949, state courts were obliged to enforce the Fourth 
Amendment to the federal constitution, along with the search 
and seizure provisions of their state constitutions. Yet the 
17. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
18. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J.) (rejecting a rule 
which would mean that "(t)he criminal is to go free because the constable has blun-
dered"). 
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choice of remedies remained in the hands of the state courts.I9 
This time around, state courts were more inclined to choose the 
exclusion remedy, based largely on their review of the futility 
over time of the tort remedy. In People v. Cahan,20 Justice 
Traynor of the California Supreme Court summarized his 
court's experience with tort remedies as follows: 
People v. Mayen [rejecting the exclusionary rule in California] 
was decided over 30 years ago. Since then case after case has 
appeared in our appellate reports describing unlawful 
searches and seizures against the defendant on trial, and those 
cases undoubtedly reflect only a small fraction of the viola-
tions of the constitutional provisions that have actually oc-
curred. On the other hand, reported cases involving civil ac-
tions against police officers are rare, and those involving 
successful criminal prosecutions against officers are nonexist-
ent. In short, the constitutional provisions are not being en-
forced.2I 
The Cahan decision moved to the center of national discus-
sion about the exclusionary rule. It found a following because, 
these courts concluded, tort remedies had proven ineffective in 
most places.22 It is difficult today to find examples of successful 
tort claims against a state or local government or a police offi-
cer, based on an illegal search. 23 
What is an interpreter of the Constitution to do when re-
viewing the history of remedies? Which history counts, the 
founding era remedies or the twentieth century reflections on 
experience with remedies? That depends on the precise ques-
tion an interpreter asks. If a constitutional methodology leads 
one to ask which specific remedy the constitutional Framers 
would have chosen under their circumstances, the answer is 
quite clear. 
19. Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
20. 282 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1955). 
21. For an account of Justice Traynor's likely views on tort remedies more gener-
ally, see Dripps, 74 N.C. L. Rev. (cited in note 3). 
22. See also State v. Mills, 98 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. 1957); Rickards v. State, 77 A.2d 199 
(Del. 1950); Md. Code Ann. art. 35, § 5 (1951); R.I. Gen. Laws§ 9-19-25 (1956). 
23. Although there is little or no appellate case law reflecting successful tort claims 
based on illegal searches, local governments do often settle such claims before trial. 
Successful claims are most often based on improper use of force during seizure of a per-
s~n .. ~t least in New York City, these suits have not been linked to officer training or 
discipline. Deborah Sontag and Dan Berry, The Price of Brutality: A Special Report. 
Police Complaints Settled, Rarely Resoh·ed, N.Y. Times at A I (September 17, 1991 ). 
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On the other hand, the structure of the Constitution might 
lead an interpreter to ask a more general question. There is ar-
guably a deep structure to the Constitution which presumes at 
least a minimally effective remedy for violations of rights.24 If an 
interpreter asks which remedy or remedies would qualify as an 
effective one, the twentieth-century experience with remedies 
must loom large. It would suggest, at the least, that we should 
hesitate to conclude that we can make the tort remedy effective 
by abolishing immunities, providing for fixed damages and at-
torneys' fees, and so forth. If founding-era history exerts a force 
on constitutional interpretation, surely more than a century of 
experience must count for something, as well. (Amar might ac-
count for experience of this sort in his appeals to practicality as 
an interpretive source.) Cahan, and cases like it, suggest that a 
remedy with a track record of failure must prove itself as a sup-
plement to the exclusionary rule before it can replace the exclu-
sionary rule. 
B 
Although Amar's constitutional technique does not work 
out its own limits, this book does make progress on a second 
task that will be a necessary part of our constitutional criminal 
procedure in the future. A quick look around the criminal jus-
tice landscape in 1998 will reveal a huge number of institutions 
at work. Each is busy creating and interpreting laws to influence 
the investigation, prosecution, defense, and adjudication of 
criminal defendants. Their work looks far different today than 
it did thirty years ago. 
Consider, for instance, state courts. Opinions from state 
appellate courts today show an awareness that they do far more 
than simply carry out the requirements of the latest U.S. Su-
preme Court decisions. State courts interpret their own consti-
tutions, and can impose greater requirements on government 
agents than the federal Constitution imposes. They do typically 
look for guidance from Supreme Court decisions on analogous 
provisions of the federal Constitution, but they are equally likely 
to turn to the opinions of courts from other states. State courts 
also have final interpretive authority over statutes, regulations, 
and other sources of law which shape the outcome in a great 
many cases. And even when state courts "merely" apply the de-
24. Biwns v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803). 
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cisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, they still make some of the 
most pertinent choices themselves. Supreme Court opinions 
typically leave much room for others to apply them in different 
ways, with very different consequences. Given the realities of 
limited direct appellate review in the Supreme Court and few 
opportunities for review in lower federal courts on habeas cor-
pus, U.S. Supreme Court decisions mean exactly what state 
courts say they mean. 
The same impression of state institutional vigor appears in 
the work of state legislatures in criminal justice. New criminal 
justice statutes appear almost every year in every state. These 
statutes sometimes clarify questions addressed with less cer-
tainty in judicial opinions; at other times, they take up entirely 
new topics. For instance, a great many statutes address the 
authority and discretion of a police officer to make an arrest in a 
family violence situation,25 a profoundly important question that 
never appears on the radar screen of constitutional adjudication. 
Recall that these state institutions deal with over 95 percent of 
all the felonies adjudicated in this country every year, with the 
federal system handling about 5 percent of the felonies (and this 
ignores the even larger imbalance in misdemeanor cases in the 
state and federal systems).26 
In a world where so many of the critical choices happen 
away from the U.S. Supreme Court, any view of constitutional 
criminal procedure must find a way to explain and shape the in-
teraction between "the Court" and the courts (which are not 
necessarily "lower"). We need a rich sense of the many ways 
that constitutional law and non-constitutional law can interact in 
criminal justice. 
Amar starts the long job of integrating federal constitu-
tional law with other sources of law relevant to criminal justice. 
In the first place, Amar makes it possible to look beyond federal 
constitutional law by breaking the stranglehold of U.S. Supreme 
Court jurisprudence. Where Amar convinces readers that 
criminal procedure now has an unhealthy obsession with the mi-
nutiae of Supreme Court opinions, he clears some space for 
other inquiries to take place. 
Amar makes a further contribution to the true task at hand. 
Particularly in his chapter on the Fourth Amendment, Amar of-
25. See 22 Okla. Stat.§ 40.3; Gen. Stat. Conn.§ 46b-38b; Iowa Code § 236.12. 
26. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, Felony Sentences in 
the United States, 1994 (July 1997, NCJ-165149). 
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fers a picture of different institutions at work. As I mentioned 
earlier, Amar suggests several "overlapping, reinforcing" en-
forcement regimes. The legislature would have some authority 
to define and to enforce "reasonableness" in searches and sei-
zures: "In cases of borderline reasonableness, the less specifi-
cally the legislature has considered and authorized the practice 
in question, the less willing judges and juries should be to up-
hold the practice." (p. 43) Amar would give similar authority to 
administrators (including police departments) to promulgate 
rules or guidelines that "publicly spell out more concrete search 
and seizure policies .... " (pp. 43-44) Judges and juries would 
add to the mix their own views about the reasonableness of 
searches or seizures. 
To my way of thinking, the most interesting feature of this 
vision is its interactive quality. Amar does not propose only that 
the Constitution sets basic principles, while non-constitutional 
law fills in the details. Rather, each of the institutions at work 
on the concept of "reasonableness" can influence the views of 
others. Constitutional reasonableness turns on the quality of the 
work which many different institutions have done. At least, says 
Amar, this is true in close cases. Need it be only in close cases? 
This is a constitutional "etiquette." It promotes-and here I 
draw on the rigorous legal analysis of Miss Manners27-the ability 
to co-exist and to listen to others with respect, without denying 
the depth of the differences between one person (or institution) 
and another. 
Unfortunately, Amar does not consistently show this same 
sensitivity to the many institutions at work when he takes up the 
"first principles" of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. His pass-
ing observations about non-constitutional law in these chapters 
usually just note that some sources of law (such as rules of evi-
dence dealing with hearsay) sometimes require more than the 
relevant constitutional clause (such as the confrontation clause). 
(pp. 125-31) Surely there is more to say here.28 It seems plausi-
27. Judith Martin, Common Courtesy: in which Miss Manners Solves the Problem 
that Baffled Mr. Jefferson (Atheneum, 1985). In this book, Martin explains the function 
of an "artificial" and uniform set of manners in a democratic society: it makes possible 
the peaceful co-existence, in public spheres, of those with the most profound differences. 
Her account draws in part on that other "etiquette writer," Alexis de Tocqueville. 
28. Amar does make some intriguing gestures in this direction, when he points to 
the importance of "framework" statutes such as the Speedy Trial Act, (p. 236, n.77) and 
the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, which gave heightened protection from searches to 
the media. (p. 41) 
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ble, for example, that practices in misdemeanor courts around 
the country might influence our views on the Sixth Amend-
ment's "right to counsel." 
The prominence of other institutions in criminal justice, and 
the need for a new constitutional etiquette here, may distinguish 
criminal procedure from other fields. Is there another field of 
constitutional law which affects so many government agents, 
supported by so much government money, carrying out so many 
different activities, and governed by so many sets of rules? The 
very size and structure of the criminal justice system probably 
means that constitutional criminal procedure will remain a dis-
tinctive field. It will keep a distinctive set of concerns about 
those who interpret and apply legal norms daily, and about the 
"practicality" and cost of legal decisions. To the extent that 
Amar hopes to reunite constitutional criminal procedure with 
the rest of constitutional law, there are some powerful forces 
working against him. 
CONCLUSION 
Creative interpretation of a constitution poses a danger. If 
the constitution is said to resolve many specific choices facing 
the criminal justice system, even where text, history, or structure 
offer limited or equivocal evidence, the constitution crowds out 
other sources of law. This is especially troubling in a system, 
such as the criminal justice system, where there are so many who 
must create and interpret the law, where conditions change so 
profoundly over time, and where the practical costs of legal 
rules are so hard to imagine. Amar's book explains much of 
what is wrong with our current jurisprudence, and something 
about our alternatives. But this multi-source interpretive 
method does not mark the outer boundaries of its own explana-
tory power. 
The future of criminal procedure takes heed of its past, but 
that still leaves more choices open than it resolves. Our future 
must also lie in watching small developments from lots of 
sources, creating a common law method for a world where many 
who are not judges now make legal rules. Amar has helped to 
break the constitutional habit of looking to the U.S. Supreme 
Court for most of our criminal procedure. The task that remains 
is to say exactly what happens when we take our cues from many 
institutions rather than one. 
